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The well-documented human bias toward agency as a cause and therefore an explanation
of observed events is typically attributed to evolutionary selection for a “social brain”. Based
on a review of developmental and adult behavioral and neurocognitive data, it is argued that
the bias toward agency is a result of the default human solution, developed during infancy,
to the computational requirements of object re-identification over gaps in observation of
more than a few seconds. If this model is correct, overriding the bias toward agency
to construct mechanistic explanations of observed events requires structure-mapping
inferences, implemented by the pre-motor action planning system, that replace agents
with mechanisms as causes of unobserved changes in contextual or featural properties of
objects. Experiments that would test this model are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
That human beings exhibit a bias, beginning in infancy, toward
explaining events in terms of agency is well documented
(reviewed by Bloom, 2007; Boyer and Bergstrom, 2008; Rosset,
2008; Waytz et al., 2010). The classic experiments of Heider and
Simmel (1944) showing that subjects readily attribute agency
to animated geometrical shapes, which have been repeated and
elaborated upon in the years following (reviewed by Scholl and
Tremoulet, 2000; Scholl and Gao, 2013), remain one of the most
striking demonstrations of this bias toward agentive explanation.
Gao et al. (2010), for example, showed not only that adult
subjects “irresistibly” attribute both agency and malign intent to
displays of “V” shapes moving in particular ways, but also that
this spurious attribution of agency disrupts performance on a
multiple-object tracking task. The human bias toward agentive
explanation is not, of course, restricted to the laboratory. Evi-
dence from multiple cultural groups increasingly indicates that
adults regularly explain events by appeal to a combination of
supernatural agentive causes and natural, non-agentive causes
(Legare et al., 2012). That supernatural and teleological causes
tend to be invoked preferentially under conditions involving time
limitations (e.g., Gelman and Legare, 2011) or stress (e.g., Paul,
2009) suggests that they represent a default strategy and hence
a cognitive bias; indeed Kelemen et al. (2013) have recently
shown that even professional physical scientists readily accept
teleological explanations of natural phenomena when stressed
with time limitations. While technological culture by itself might
be expected to reduce the frequency of explanatory appeals to
supernatural agency in particular, the high level of religiosity
in the United States (Paul, 2009) indicates otherwise. Indeed,
technological culture both promulgates and benefits from the bias
toward agency in areas ranging from automobile esthetics to the
ubiquitous and increasingly psychologically-sophisticated use of
the “agent metaphor” in user-interface design (e.g., Schiaffino and
Amandi, 2004).
What remains less clear is the source of this bias toward
agentive explanation. While robust traditions of psychological,
sociological and cultural analyses have focused on the emergence
and maintenance of the religious manifestation of the bias toward
agency in communities of adults (see reviews by Main, Davie and
Bowie, respectively, in Segal, 2006), research over the last two
decades increasingly indicates that the bias toward agency devel-
ops in early infancy and depends only on non-specific experience
(reviewed by Luo and Baillargeon, 2010; Bremner, 2011; Csibra
and Gergely, 2012; Rottman and Kelemen, 2012; see Vaden and
Woolley, 2011 for evidence that the religious manifestation of
the bias does depend on specific religious experience). Employ-
ing cross-cultural data, Kelemen (2012), for example, discounts
parental, social and broader cultural influences as explanations of
the “promiscuous teleology” of children in favor of a cognitive
developmental explanation based on the possession by infants of
“intentional agent” as a fundamental category and their tendency
to interpret all observed events as caused, directly or indirectly, by
such agents. The origin of the category “intentional agent” and
the tendency of infants, children and even adults to employ it
ubiquitously is often explained in turn by appeal to the “social
brain hypothesis” that human cognitive architecture is an evolu-
tionary adaptation to a selective environment in which competing
individuals were and still are forced to cooperate within cohesive
social groups (reviewed by Adolphs, 2003, 2009; Dunbar, 2003;
Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). According to this hypothesis, the
agentive actions of conspecifics, whether friends or foes, largely
defined the selective environment of hominid evolution; the over-
application of agentive explanations outside the social sphere is an
unsurprising consequence of the tendency of selective pressures to
favor false positives from risk detectors over false negatives. While
this evolutionary account explains why a bias toward agency
might be expected in human populations, however, it does not
explain either how the bias is implemented or its developmental
time course.
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As noted, the bias toward agency first becomes apparent in
early infancy. While infants are able to categorize observed objects
as “inanimate” and even as “self-propelled inanimate” (Luo et al.,
2009; Rakison and Yermolayeva, 2010), infant recognition of non-
agentive causation appears to be limited to directly-observed,
contact-dependent transfers of mechanical force (Spelke, 1994).
Changes in behavior that do not result from observed contact
forces, such as autonomous changes in direction of motion that
result in circumvention of an obstacle, indicate agency. Infants
are surprised by self-propelled inanimate objects and often (see
below) categorize them as “agents”. Considerable evidence indi-
cates that the recognition of agency is implemented, at least in
part, by the mirror neuron system (MNS; reviewed by Cattaneo
and Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Casile et al.,
2011). As the origin, development, functions and anatomical
extent of the MNS, the extent to which mirror neurons as origi-
nally defined (di Pellegrino et al., 1992) contribute to perception-
action “mirroring” as a functional outcome, and the extent to
which the association of perceived actions with heterologous
motor representations can be considered a “mirror” function
are all subject to considerable debate (e.g., Gallese et al., 2011;
Cook et al., 2014), here the term “MNS” is used broadly to
refer to components of the visuo-motor system that produce spe-
cific motor excitations in response to specific visual perceptions
and hence implement mirroring—again broadly conceived—as
a function. Some recent evidence suggests that this mirroring
function, and hence an MNS, is sufficiently developed at birth
to allow the discrimination between erect point-light walkers
and inverted ones (Simion et al., 2008; Bardi et al., 2011; see
Pavlova, 2012 for a review of contrasting findings). Early involve-
ment of the MNS in the recognition of agency is particularly
indicated by the correlation between infant abilities to imitate
actions—in some cases, only after appropriate training—and to
recognize those same actions as goal-directed and hence inten-
tional when they are performed by other entities categorized
as agents (reviewed by Woodward et al., 2009; Marshall and
Meltzoff, 2011). The parallel development of agency detection
and MNS capabilities in infants, together with the very limited
and specific infant abilities to recognize non-agentive causes,
suggests that agency can be regarded as an experience-dependent
but nonetheless architecturally-specified default representation
of causation in infancy. The question of why the bias toward
agency survives into adulthood can, therefore, be viewed as the
question of why this infant default should survive post-infancy
experience, and in particular, why it should survive post-infancy
experience in highly-technological cultural settings in which self-
propelled or otherwise self-powered artifacts are both ubiqui-
tous and available for exploratory investigation, and in which
explicit educational instruction in mechanistic thinking is nearly
universal. Recent evidence that adults cross-culturally are even
more biased toward supernatural agency, in particular, as an
explanation than are children (Woolley et al., 2011) makes this
question even more urgent. Assuming that the bias toward agency
is an evolutionary outcome as postulated by the social brain
hypothesis, what is it about the implementation of this outcome
that makes it so refractory, both to experience and to consciously-
accessible explicit knowledge? At least some children exposed to
self- or remotely-powered artifacts develop an understanding that
internal or remote mechanisms can cause complex behaviors dur-
ing the preschool years (Kushnir and Gopnik, 2007; Sobel et al.,
2007; Sobel and Buchanan, 2009; Buchanan and Sobel, 2011),
a period during which “folk physics” capabilities are rapidly
developing (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). Why does the attribution of
agency to, for example, animated geometrical shapes survive this
transition to a post-infancy understanding of mechanism-driven
causality?
The present paper proposes that the infant bias toward agency
is maintained, at least in part, by the computational requirements
of re-identifying individual objects as the same individuals across
changes in features and context. As emphasized by Baillargeon
(2008), the human cognitive architecture appears to implement,
from birth, a “principle of persistence” according to which objects
“not only exist continuously and remain cohesive, they also retain
their individual properties” (p. 3) in the absence of identifiable
causal influences. Hence infants are surprised, for example, when
an object has disappeared or its position has changed following a
brief occlusion. As infants mature, they are increasingly capable of
re-identifying objects after substantial “occlusions”—for example,
after waking up the next morning—in a way that is robust
against differences in both object locations and features. Re-
identifying objects as persistent individuals across substantial gaps
in observation during which context-changing motions and/or
featural changes have occurred requires attributing an unobserved
cause to the observed differences in context or features (reviewed
by Rips et al., 2006; Scholl, 2007; Fields, 2012a). If agency is
the default cause of motion and feature change available in
infancy and early childhood, unobserved agentive causes can be
expected to be associated with every individual object on every
occasion of its re-identification in a different context or with
altered features. Attributing a mechanical cause to differences
in the features or context of an object re-identified following a
gap in observation requires overriding this default within the
object re-identification system. It is suggested that mechanical
causes become available to the object re-identification system
via structure mapping inferences, the kind of inferences that
implement analogies (Gentner, 1983; Markman and Gentner,
2001), and that they become available only following appropri-
ate experience. Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that
these structure-mapping inferences are implemented by the pre-
motor action-planning system (Schubotz, 2007; Bubic et al., 2010;
Fields, 2011a, 2012b). If this model of object re-identification is
correct, agentive explanations remain the default into adulthood
unless they are replaced, via this structure-mapping process, by
mechanical explanations in the functional context of the object
re-identification system.
The sections that follow review the evidence supporting this
model and discuss experiments that would further test it. The
next section, “Background” briefly reviews the past decade of
experimental work on visual indicators of agency during infancy,
infant abilities to recognize and imitate actions performed by
entities identified as agents, and pre-school abilities to understand
mechanism-driven causation. The latter studies show that while
agentive explanations remain a default for pre-schoolers, they
can override this default in at least some contexts to produce
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explanations that appeal to hidden mechanisms as causes. The
third section, “The Role of Causal Reasoning in Tracking Object
Identity Over Time” reviews evidence that representations of
unobserved causal processes encoded by the pre-motor action-
planning system play an obligate role in re-identifying objects
across gaps in observation of more than a few seconds. If all
unobserved causal processes are agentive, their role in object re-
identification over time renders object identity itself dependent
on agency. The fourth section, “Mechanism-Driven Causation as
An Obligate Analog of Agency” reviews evidence that structure
mapping inferences are required to replace representations of
internal or external agents with representations of unobserved
mechanisms as the causes of changes in object locations or fea-
tures across gaps in observation. As such inferences require cog-
nitive resources, the explanation of observed changes by appeal to
unobserved mechanisms is intrinsically more resource-intensive
than their explanation by appeals to unknown agents. The fifth
section, “Overriding the Bias Toward Agency” summarizes the
resulting model of the bias toward agency, its maintenance into
adulthood, and the kinds of experiences required to override the
bias; it also discusses experiments that would further test the
model. The paper concludes by briefly exploring the link between
“social brains” and the ability to re-identify objects over time
that the model implies. Such an ability is clearly required by
any social organization that requires its members to recognize
individual conspecifics over extended time. The model thus sug-
gests that the social utility of recognized individuality, not just
requirements for group cohesion or cooperation in the face of
similarly-organized competitors, drives the evolution of social
brains.
BACKGROUND
INDICATORS OF AGENCY IN INFANCY
“Agent” appears to be a fundamental, and quite possibly innate,
ontological category for human infants (Luo and Baillargeon,
2010; Bremner, 2011; Csibra and Gergely, 2012; Rottman and
Kelemen, 2012). One can ask, therefore, what perceptual cues
indicate agency to infants, and if or how these indicators change
over the course of infancy. In particular, one can ask what indica-
tors are sufficient, either individually or collectively, as indicators
of agency to infants, and whether any of these sufficient indicators
are also necessary.
Infants orient from birth toward human faces (reviewed by
Simion et al., 2011). One can hypothesize, therefore, that having
a human or human-like face is a sufficient indicator of agency
for infants. Kamawari et al. (2005) tested this hypothesis by com-
paring the responses of 6.5 month-old infants to three displays
showing candidate “agents” approaching a stationary target—a
stepped block—via either a straight path or a path containing a
detour. Unnecessary detours by either a human actor or a robot
with a human-like face were surprising to infants, as measured by
increased looking time, while an unnecessary detour by a feature-
less rectangular block elicited no surprise. A moving object with a
human-like face, therefore, appears sufficient to indicate agency to
6.5-month-old infants. A subsequent experiment (Csibra, 2008)
modeled closely on that of Kamawari et al. showed, however,
that a human-like face is not necessary. In this experiment, the
responses of 6.5-month-old infants to an unnecessary detour by
a featureless rectangular block were compared with the indepen-
dent variable being whether the infants had previously watched
the block detour around a visible obstacle using only one path—a
condition that replicated the design of Kamawari et al. (2005)—
or using two paths of equal efficiency. Infants who had previously
observed the block follow multiple paths to the target were
surprised by the unnecessary detour, suggesting an attribution
of agency to the moving block. This result is consistent with
other studies (Biro and Leslie, 2007; Luo, 2011) that demonstrate
equifinal variations of actions by self-propelled objects as an
indicator of agency in infants as young as 3 months.
These results, which rely on a visual perception task and there-
fore provide information about visual information-processing
pathways, indicate that while feature information—a human-
like face—may be sufficient as an indicator of agency, trajectory
information alone is also sufficient. Whether trajectory informa-
tion is necessary has not been determined; ethical experimental
protocols cannot test, for example, whether having a human-
like face would indicate agency to young infants even if enti-
ties with human-like faces were never observed to move. Even
with this proviso, however, a significant fact about architecture
can be inferred: while activations of the ventral “what” visual
pathway that processes feature information can contribute to
the identification of agents by infants, activations of the dorsal
“where” visual pathway that processes trajectory information can
identify agents in the absence of agent-specific feature infor-
mation. This dominance of dorsal trajectory recognition over
ventral feature recognition for agency detection makes sense on
evolutionary grounds. In the ancestral human niche, most self-
propelled objects were agents: humans or other animals. If agents
are more likely to be either helpful or dangerous than non-agents,
being able to identify them using only the relatively-fast, feature-
independent dorsal stream is advantageous. Dorsal-stream dom-
inance is also familiar: trajectory information dominates feature
information in determining what is represented, at the object-
file level, as a persistent entity within a visual scene (reviewed
by Treisman, 2006; Scholl, 2007; Flombaum et al., 2008; Fields,
2011b). Hence sufficient indicators of agency are present in the
object file, the initial visual-system representation on which all
downstream processing acts, in feature-independent form when-
ever a moving agent is detected. From this it can be inferred that
excitations of superior temporal sulcus (STS) are components of
the initial visual representation of an observed agent (Rizzolatti
and Matelli, 2003; Nassi and Callaway, 2009). The initial visual
representations of non-agents—passive objects that move only
when acted upon by contact forces or gravity, and self-propelled
objects that follow invariant, typically linear trajectories—can
similarly be expected to involve excitations of medial temporal
gyrus (MTG).
As infants continue to mature from 6 months to the onset
of communicative language use at 18–24 months, their abilities
to represent features of objects and hence distinguish between
individual agents or categories of agents progressively improve
(Baillargeon et al., 2011, 2012). As discussed below, their abilities
to recognize and imitate actions also improve. Available evidence
does not, however, suggest that either the perceptual indicators
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of agency or the variety of objects to which agency may be
attributed change during this period; merely being self-propelled,
for example, is still demonstrably insufficient as an indicator of
agency at 18 months (Cicchino et al., 2011). Indeed, adult tenden-
cies to attribute agency to animated geometric shapes using the
same trajectory indicators used by infants (Scholl and Tremoulet,
2000) suggest that these indicators remain stable across the
lifespan.
The experiments reviewed above would be uninterpretable
without the assumption that the infants involved, starting at the
youngest ages tested (i.e., 3 months), are aware of both the moving
objects and their motion. Nothing in either the experiments or the
inferences drawn from them, however, implies or even suggests
that the infants involved are aware of their categorization of the
objects involved as agents. As Whitehead (2001) has emphasized,
the conflation of awareness with awareness of awareness is a com-
mon cause of confusion and over-statement in cognitive science;
a similar confusion must be avoided here. While it is justified
to regard these infants as possessing a procedurally-implemented
perceptual category “agent”, it is unjustified—at least on the basis
of the results reviewed here—to regard them as possessing a
consciously accessible concept “agent” prior to their acquisition of
theory-of-mind (ToM) language in the late preschool years (Saxe
et al., 2004).
ACTION RECOGNITION AND IMITATION IN INFANCY
Mirror system function in infants has been examined at the
behavioral level using both looking time and imitation measures.
As noted, even 2-day-old infants appear to be more interested, as
measured by looking time, in an upright point-light walker dis-
play than an inverted display, even when the display shows a hen
walking as opposed to a human (Simion et al., 2008; Bardi et al.,
2011). Similar experiments suggest that the direction of motion of
a human point-light walker display, which remains stationary as
if on a treadmill, is detectable by 6-month-old infants (Kuhlmeier
et al., 2010). The interpretation of looking-time results is not
completely straightforward (for discussions see Aslin, 2007; Turk-
Browne et al., 2008) and may be particularly problematic in
the case of point-light walkers, which are neither connected nor
bounded and thus violate two of the key “principles” of persistent
object identification (Baillargeon, 2008; Flombaum et al., 2008).
However, the apparent ability of even the youngest infants to
“notice” point-light walkers as interesting and to extract useful
information from such displays suggests that infants are able to
construct object files that capture coherent motion at a high level
of abstraction (Fields, 2011b).
While the role of MNS in action imitation remains controver-
sial as noted (Gallese et al., 2011; Cook et al., 2014), considerable
evidence now indicates that action-imitation abilities are strongly
dependent on prior experience with action performance. For
example, 3-month-old infants provided with and trained in the
use of sticky mittens that enabled them to “grasp” objects even
before the typical onset of coordinated grasping were able to
imitate observed grasping actions by an adult wearing similar
mittens, while infants provided with mittens but not trained in
their use were unable to perform or imitate grasping (Woodward,
2009). The correlation between the ability to imitate an action
and prior spontaneous or trained performance of that action
continues through later childhood (reviewed by Del Giudice et al.,
2009; Woodward et al., 2009; Ray and Heyes, 2010) and into adult-
hood (Heyes, 2012). Infant imitation is not restricted to human
or even animate actors; even 9-month-old infants will imitate, to
the extent possible given their behavioral repertoires, the actions
of mechanical devices provided that they perceive such devices as
agents (Boyer et al., 2011). Such imitation of mechanical devices
becomes commonplace in the preschool years, when children
frequently imitate the sounds and motions of cars, airplanes, or
other machines—often accompanied by announcements such as
“I’m an airplane”—in unstructured play.
As the defining function of the MNS is to excite motor rep-
resentations of actions in response to observations of actions, it
is natural to hypothesize that MNS activity is centrally involved
in planning the actions that implement imitation in infants
and young children. Observations of presumptive MNS activity
in infants using high-resolution EEG recordings support this
hypothesis (Southgate et al., 2009; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011;
Nyström et al., 2011; Virji-Babul et al., 2012; reviewed by Marshall
and Meltzoff, 2011). The plasticity of the MNS, in particular
its ability to respond in an experience-dependent manner to
non-biological as well as biological motions (Schubotz and von
Cramon, 2004; Engel et al., 2007; reviewed by Catmur et al.,
2007; Heyes, 2010), is consistent with MNS involvement in the
imitation of mechanical devices as well as human or other animate
agents.
While imitation ability is sometimes characterized in terms
of “intention reading” (e.g., Woodward et al., 2009; Luo and
Baillargeon, 2010), it is important, as noted earlier, to avoid the
inference that infants are reflectively aware of either the goals of
observed actions or the intentions of the agents who perform
them (Paulus, 2012a), or that infants “rationally”—again in any
sense requiring reflective awareness—choose imitative actions
that meet mechanical criteria of efficiency (Paulus, 2012b). Activ-
ity in the MNS does not entail awareness of what the MNS is
computing; the results reviewed are consistent with the view that
infants are aware of the actor and action being imitated, and are
aware of their own imitative actions, but are not aware that their
actions are imitative. They are, similarly, consistent with the view
that infants categorize some observed actions as goal-directed and
hence intentional, but lack any consciously-accessible concepts of
goal-directedness or intentionality prior to the development of
ToM language.
DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISM-BASED CAUSAL REASONING IN
CHILDHOOD
Pre-school children in industrialized cultures—at least within
the affluent demographic primarily studied by developmental
cognitive psychologists (Henrich et al., 2010)—live in environ-
ments in which self-propelled devices capable of variable and
sometimes complex behaviors are both common and available
for manipulation and exploration; many such devices are, indeed,
toys intended for use by pre-schoolers. Children as young as
3 years old are sufficiently familiar with batteries, for example,
to understand that their presence is necessary to make some
devices display expected behaviors (Buchanan and Sobel, 2011).
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From the perspective of infant object categorization, this is a
striking ability: a battery is a passive, non-self-propelled object,
a battery-less mechanical toy is a passive, non-self-propelled
object, but a mechanical toy with batteries installed may be self-
propelled and display other behaviors indicative of agency, and
may indeed be regarded by the child as an agent. How pre-
schoolers represent such categorization conflicts, and whether
they resolve them in the context of reflectively-accessible “mental
models” (Gentner, 2002) of devices such as mechanical toys
remains to be investigated. Ordinary observations, however, are
sufficient to show that children find the resolution of such con-
flicts enjoyable and rewarding, just as adults find understanding
“how things work” enjoyable and rewarding (reviewed by Fields,
2011c).
By 4 years old, children are able to identify unfamiliar inter-
nal parts of objects as conferring causal power in the way that
batteries do (Sobel et al., 2007), although 3-year-olds lack this
more general ability. Four-year-olds are also able to recognize
that visible connections from one object to another—such as
wires—are able to transfer causal power even though they do not
move and hence do not transfer mechanical force; again, 3-year-
olds lack this ability (Buchanan and Sobel, 2011). Between 4 and
5 years old, children develop an understanding of non-contact
causation that operates at a distance, in the way a TV remote
control does (Kushnir and Gopnik, 2007; Sobel and Buchanan,
2009). In all of these cases, the causally-efficacious part employed
in the experiments—whether an unfamiliar internal component,
a wire-like connection, or a colored block capable of remotely
activating a “blicket” detector—was otherwise a passive, non-self-
propelled object, as was the object that the causally-efficacious
part activated. Hence all of these experiments required children
to resolve categorization conflicts involving passive, non-self-
propelled objects acting in agent-like ways when appropriately
associated.
It is worth emphasizing how far from contact forces and
rigid-body mechanical motions—the core domain of folk physics
learned from infancy by observation and exploratory manip-
ulation (McCloskey, 1983; Karmiloff-Smith, 1995)—these pre-
school abilities to recognize otherwise passive parts as causally
efficacious go. The pushes and pulls of rigid-body mechanical
forces are readily understandable in terms of somatosensory
and proprioceptive sensations and felt muscular effort; such
non-verbal kinematic and dynamic understanding enables tool
improvisation using rigid bodies not just in humans, but in
many other species (Fields, 2011a). Neither somatosensory and
proprioceptive sensations nor felt muscular effort, however, is
sufficient to understand that a battery can make a mechanical
toy go, or that a remote control can turn on a television. While
an appreciation of folk physics confers considerable predictive
power, the ability to attribute internal structure or remote causal
powers to otherwise passive objects is the requisite first step
toward the kind of analytical thinking that underlies reverse
engineering and other forms of diagnostic reasoning as well
as all theoretical sciences concerned with how things work as
opposed to merely what things do. Baron-Cohen (2002, 2008) has
termed this particular kind of analytical thinking “systemizing”
to emphasize that it involves viewing complex objects as systems
of interacting components. The experiments of Gopnik, Sobel
and their colleagues demonstrate that robust systemizing abilities
begin to develop, given appropriate experience, between 3 and 5
years of age.
Systemizing is not the only ability that children begin to
develop between 3 and 5 years of age: this is also the time when
they begin to develop robust ToM abilities, in particular, the
ability to attribute explicit, linguistically-reportable mental-state
contents to others (reviewed by Saxe et al., 2004). Sobel and
Munro (2009) have provided evidence that these co-developing
abilities are non-trivially related by showing that 3-year-olds
could recognize an object with hidden causal power if they con-
strued it mentalistically as “liked by” a target object, even though
they were unable to identify such objects as having hidden causal
power under a mechanistic construal. Indeed throughout this
age range, as well as after, children display a marked preference
for mentalistic explanations, including teleological explanations,
over mechanistic explanations (reviewed by Kelemen, 2004); their
new-found ability to understand causal mechanisms sometimes
overrides but does not replace the bias toward agency in their
understanding of the world. It will be argued in the Section,
Mechanism-Driven Causation as an Obligate Analog of Agency
below that the co-development of systemizing and ToM abilities
may be the key to understanding how the capability for systemiz-
ing develops during pre-school childhood.
THE ROLE OF CAUSAL REASONING IN TRACKING OBJECT
IDENTITY OVER TIME
With the above background, the question posed in the intro-
duction can be formulated more precisely: if pre-school chil-
dren develop an understanding of mechanism-driven causation—
possibly only an implicit, unverbalized understanding—that
enables them to grasp the fact that passive inanimate objects
such as batteries or wires can cause otherwise passive inani-
mate objects to behave in complex, unpredictable ways, or to
grasp the fact that such causal powers can act over a distance
without mechanical contact, why do they still exhibit a gen-
eral preference for causal explanations that appeal to agency?
Why, in particular, does this new understanding not lead to the
replacement of agentive causation by mechanical causation as
the default explanation of the behavior of inanimate objects?
One possible answer to this question is that explanations that
appeal to agency are simply easier to construct than explana-
tions that appeal to internal, remote, or otherwise non-obvious
mechanisms. It is often claimed, for example, that systemizing
is a poor strategy for understanding human behavior because
human behavior is complex and unpredictable (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 2002). Implicit in this claim is the idea that it is some-
how easier to postulate an unknown intention than it is to
postulate an unknown mechanism, and perhaps easier as well to
imagine a situation-specific intention to explain an unexpected
or unusual occurrence that it is to imagine a situation-specific
mechanism. The results of Kelemen (2004, 2012) suggest that
young children find it easier to construct teleological explanations
than non-teleological ones; the experiments of Kelemen et al.
(2013) with Ph.D.-level scientists and humanities scholars as
well as the prominent cross-cultural role of adult religion as
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an explanation of “inexplicable events” suggests that the same
is true of adults. Hence our motivating question can also be
posed as: why should it be easier—less resource-intensive, or less
architecturally complex—for the human neurocognitive system
to construct agent-based rather than mechanism-based explana-
tions of events? What is it about the representation of causes
that makes representing an unobserved agentive cause easier than
representing an unknown mechanical cause? The evolutionary
considerations underlying the social brain hypothesis suggest that
an asymmetry in the representation of agentive vs. mechanical
causes may be advantageous, but they shed no light on this
question of implementation.
The primary hypothesis of the present paper is that a pre-
motor representation of agency as a cause of both motion and
featural change plays a critical role, throughout infancy and into
early childhood, in the developing ability to represent objects as
persistent through time, and therefore in the developing ability
to re-identify objects as individuals across increasingly large gaps
in observation. A corollary of this hypothesis is that the ability
to represent an internal or remote mechanism—particularly an
unobserved mechanism—as a cause of either motion and featural
change is derivative, by structure mapping inferences, from the
ability to represent agents as causes. If this hypothesis is correct,
the human bias toward agency survives from infancy into adult-
hood because mechanism-based causal reasoning is in fact harder
than agent-based causal reasoning: it requires additional inferen-
tial steps and therefore additional neurocognitive capabilities and
resources. The remainder of this section reviews evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis that pre-motor representations of causality
enable object re-identification across gaps in observation. The
next section reviews evidence that mechanism-driven causation
is an obligate analog of agency-driven causation. The final section
discusses experimental designs to further test the resulting model
of object re-identification.
Alert infants are not indifferent to changes occurring in their
environments; however, the changes to which they are sensitive
are highly dependent on both age and experience. Four and a
half month-old infants, for example, are initially unable to segre-
gate displays of unfamiliar stationary solid objects into distinct,
bounded entities, but with appropriate experience with objects
similar to those displayed can do so (Needham et al., 2005).
Spelke (1994) synthesized results from early experiments with
infant object segregation and re-identification to propose that
infants employ innate “principles” of cohesion and continuity of
motion to segregate objects, and an innate principle of physical
contact for the transmission of mechanical forces. This latter
principle applies in particular to inanimate objects, which are
typically not self-propelled and hence move only when acted
upon by an agent; it applies, moreover, to physical contact that
has been observed. With results from many subsequent stud-
ies, Baillargeon (2008) generalized from the principles of cohe-
sion and continuity of motion to propose that infants employ
an innate principle of persistence for both objects and their
attended properties, with the explicit proviso that the types of
properties taken to be persistent depend on age and experi-
ence (see also Baillargeon et al., 2011, 2012). Statements that
such principles constitute a fundamental form of “knowledge”
(Spelke, 1994) or inform infants’ “reasoning” (Baillargeon, 2008)
about objects do not, however, shed any light on how such
principles might be implemented by the developing neurocog-
nitive system, nor can they be taken to imply that infants are
reflectively aware of either the principles that they appear to
employ or the inferences that such principles might entail (Fields,
2013a).
Experiments testing visual object tracking or judgments of
visual object persistence over short (few second) exposure times,
in some cases with brief (few 100 ms) occlusion times, have
consistently shown that trajectory information dominates feature
information in infants as it does in adults (Treisman, 2006; Scholl,
2007; Flombaum et al., 2008; Fields, 2011b). Young infants do
not, however, treat the same trajectories as indicating object
persistence that older infants, children, or adults do; 4-month-
old infants, for example, are more tolerant of changes in the
speeds of objects while occluded (Bremner et al., 2007), and do
not recognize occluded bounces as identity-preserving (Bremner
et al., 2005). These results suggest both that the excitation of
one or more visuo-motor networks that recognize specific curvi-
linear paths as trajectories is required for the recognition of
object persistence during short visual exposures, and that the
specificities of such trajectory-recognition networks change over
developmental time (Fields, 2011b). As demonstrated by Need-
ham et al. (2005) as well as by many others, however, object
features play an increasingly-significant role in both visual object
segmentation and re-identification over longer visual exposures,
including exposures involving occluders; indeed infants would
be incapable of re-identifying objects that had changed positions
while unattended—for example, while the infant was sleeping—if
this were not the case.
The simplest heuristic with which to re-identify objects
across significant gaps in observation extends and operationalizes
“Leibniz’s Law” of the identity of indiscernibles: if two objects
appear to be the very same thing, then assume, ceteris paribus
and allowing for “reasonable” changes in location between obser-
vations, that they are the very same thing. In a world in which
Baillargeon’s (2008) principle of persistence held universally for
properties other than location, and in which indiscernible dupli-
cates of objects did not exist, this operationalized version of
Leibniz’s Law would be not just a convenient heuristic, but an
actual solution to the problem of object re-identification: the
same collection of properties would always indicate the same
object, and any differences in observed properties would indicate
a different object. Even in the world of the infant, however,
object properties do sometimes change between observations, and
indiscernible duplicates, particularly of manufactured artifacts,
do exist. At least by the pre-school years, children supplement
Leibniz’s Law with information about the history of an object
between perceptual encounters when making judgments about
identity. Gutheil et al. (2008), for example, showed that 4 and
5-year olds can employ historical information to distinguish
between otherwise-indiscernible artifacts, while both Hood and
Bloom (2008) and Frazier and Gelman (2009) showed that
4-year-olds incorporate information about an object’s history
into judgments of its value. Such results, together with a broad
variety of studies of adult object re-identification (reviewed by
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Rips et al., 2006; Bullot and Rysiew, 2007; Scholl, 2007; Xu,
2007; Flombaum et al., 2008) and consideration of relevant neu-
roscience (reviewed by Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Martin, 2007;
Bubic et al., 2010; Zimmer and Ecker, 2010), suggest that the
incorporation of historical and hence causal information is obli-
gate in human object re-identification (Fields, 2012a). As the
histories of objects while they are not observed are typically
unknown, the causal histories typically employed in object re-
identification across significant gaps in observation are fictive:
they must be constructed, on demand, whenever an object is
re-identified.
Functional neuroimaging studies suggest that the pre-motor
action planning system, including areas of inferior (IPL) and
superior (SPL) parietal lobules activated by observed actions
and motions respectively, is involved in the construction of such
fictive causal histories (FCHs; for a review of relevant stud-
ies see Fields, 2012a). These parietal areas support perception-
action mirroring and are components of the MNS as broadly
conceived (e.g., Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009). As discussed
in the Section, Action Recognition and Imitation in Infancy
above, at least some components of this system appear to be
functional from early infancy, and to support imitation in par-
ticular. Hence it seems plausible to consider FCH construction
as an architecturally-specified function of the action-planning
system, including its mirror components, from early infancy
onwards. The construction of FCHs can, in other words, be
expected to implement the “principle of persistence” for objects
that remain unobserved for more than a few seconds from infancy
onwards.
MECHANISM-DRIVEN CAUSATION AS AN OBLIGATE
ANALOG OF AGENCY
As reviewed in the Section, Development of Mechanism-Based
Causal Reasoning in Childhood above, children begin to develop
an understanding of hidden, internal causes (e.g., batteries) and
of non-contact or non-mechanical causes (e.g., remote controls,
wires) only during the pre-school years, and only robustly during
the late pre-school years. Prior to that, all autonomous or hidden
causation—all causation other than observed contact mechanical
causation—is attributed exclusively to agents. The construction
of FCHs requires the representation of unobserved causes; hence
the only causes that can be represented by FCHs constructed to
re-identify objects prior to the development of an understanding
of hidden, non-contact, or non-mechanical causes are agentive
causes. Every change in location or features of a re-identified
object can be expected, therefore, to be associated with some
causal agent by the very FCH employed to re-identify that object.
If this is correct, such explanations as “someone put it there”,
“someone took my toy” or “someone changed the doll’s clothes”
are not just typical explanations for change in the infant and
early-pre-school worlds, they are the only possible explanations
for changes. Absent the ability to construct a representation of a
causal agent, which may well be an unknown “someone”, change
cannot be represented by an FCH and hence is not perceptible:
without a causal agent to alter an object’s location or features,
the altered object can only be perceived as a different entity.
It has been suggested, on the basis of this model of object
re-identification as involving obligate FCH construction, that an
inability to construct agent-driven FCHs and hence an inability
to re-identify objects—including other human beings—across
gaps in observation may explain the typical social, linguistic, and
attentional presentations of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs;
Fields, 2012a,c).
If the human bias toward agency is embedded in the very
mechanism of object re-identification as proposed here, how can
the bias be overridden? How can adults, let alone 4-year-olds,
come to realize that inanimate objects can change their own
locations, or change their own features, without the intervention
of any agent of any kind? How can anyone, for example, come
to the realization that hurricanes are not directed toward their
destinations by gods? If the model of object re-identification as
involving obligate FCH construction is correct, this can only
occur if (1) a mechanism represented as contained within or asso-
ciated with the object itself inferentially replaces the otherwise-
obligate external agent in an FCH constructed to re-identify the
object; and (2) this mechanism-based FCH out-competes any
agent-based FCH as a basis for further inferences about the object.
A hurricane must, for example, be represented as containing
mechanisms that, by suitable interactions with the hurricane’s
environment, move it along a particular trajectory as a self-
propelled but inanimate object, and this representation must
out-compete representations of the hurricane as moved along its
trajectory by some external agent. This can only happen if two
conditions are met. First, the pre-motor planning system, and
in particular its mirror components, must be able to represent
inanimate objects as autonomous causes, at least within particular
kinds of contexts, of their own motions and featural changes.
Second, either the mechanism-based FCH itself or other repre-
sentations activated during the course of object re-identification
must suppress competing agent-based FCHs. The remainder of
this section focuses on the construction of mechanism-based
FCHs; the conditions under which such FCHs can override the
bias toward agency are considered in the Section, Overriding the
Bias Toward Agency.
The function of the MNS within the visuo-motor system
is to connect seeing and doing: to re-represent a 3rd person
perspective on an action as a 1st person perspective. Typically-
developing human beings cannot help but view familiar goal-
directed actions such as grasping a coffee cup as intentional
when they are performed by other humans, it has been claimed
(e.g., Gallese, 2007), because their MNSs map observed actions
to goal-oriented intentions. Such inferred intentions may be
experienced only as attributions to the observed actor; what is
important is that they are available, un- or pre-consciously, for
further inferences about the observed agent’s goals or future
behavior. It is the failure of this action-to-intention mapping
in ASDs—at least for actions without perceptible mechanical
consequences—that motivates the “broken mirrors” hypoth-
esis for ASD (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Oberman and
Ramachandran, 2007). The plasticity of the MNS on its input
side enables the bias toward agency by enabling the mapping of
observed non-biological motions to representations of 1st person
actions and their typically-accompanying intentions, and hence
the representation of inanimate non-agents as agents (Catmur
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et al., 2007; Heyes, 2010, 2012). It is this mapping that presum-
ably implements the “irresistible” perception of certain motions
as indicative of agency, even if they are executed by animated
geometrical shapes (Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; Scholl and Gao,
2013).
The pre-motor representation of action does not, however,
only involve intention; it also, and from the standpoint of exe-
cuting a planned action, it primarily involves a representation
of the directed muscular effort required to successfully complete
the action. Directed muscular effort is the intuitive human rep-
resentation of applied force; the force required to pull or push
something is just the directed muscular effort required to pull
or push it. The mapping from applied effort to achieved results
is learned by actively and experimentally manipulating objects,
beginning in early infancy; a correct representation of the applied
effort required to execute a motion is what makes imitation, for
example, possible. By constructing a pre-motor representation
of an observed action, the MNS associates the observed action
with a felt sense of applied effort. The actions of other agents,
and of other entities interpreted by the MNS as agents, are
therefore represented not just as intentional but also as effortful,
as transferring effective force. This feeling that force has been
transferred is as irresistible as the sense of agency in animations
that depict collisions between simple geometric shapes.
In order to plan novel manipulations, the pre-motor system
must perform a particular kind of inference: it must predict, on
the basis of representations of the object to be manipulated, the
motion desired and past experience manipulating similar objects,
a representation of the applied force required to achieve the
desired motion. To produce an effective motor plan, such force-
motion scaling must be quantitatively correct. Inferences that
preserve relations between the represented components of distinct
situations or events are structure mappings (Gentner, 1983);
three decades of experimental and computer simulation work
have shown that structure mappings are the underlying drivers
of analogical inferences (reviewed by Markman and Gentner,
2001; Gentner, 2003; Holyoak, 2005). It has been shown, by an
analysis of the mechanisms involved in tool improvisation in both
humans and non-human animals, that the force-motion scaling
inferences performed by the pre-motor action planning system
are structure mappings, and can therefore be considered to be
analogies (Fields, 2011a). As visual imagination is implemented
by excitations of the same intermediate visual and visuo-motor
pathways as visual perception (reviewed by Kosslyn et al., 2006;
Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009), any event that can be visualized
can be used as input to a structure mapping inference by the
human pre-motor action planning system. Functional imaging
studies indicate that pre-motor force-motion scaling imple-
ments structure-mapping analogies both in abstract but visual-
izable domains involving forces and motions (Fields, 2012b) and
in formal domains representing metaphorical motions (Fields,
2013b).
Structure-mapping analogy provides an inferential mecha-
nism by which hidden, remote, or non-mechanical causes can
replace agency as generators of observed actions. Once a situ-
ation in which batteries, remote controls, electrical wires, car
engines or other such mechanisms has been observed to cause
motion or feature changes is available in memory, it becomes
available as a base case for analogy; seeing that batteries can
make a toy car go, for example, makes it possible to suppose
not only that batteries make other things go, but that other
inanimate objects somewhat like batteries might make things
go. For such analogies to be implemented by the pre-motor
planning system as components of FCH construction, their base
cases must be represented in a modality that is available to this
system, e.g., as a visual imagination. That multiple perceptual and
imaginative modalities can excite visuo-motor representations in
adults is well-established in the case of tools and their typical
uses (reviewed by Lewis, 2006); the results of Loewenstein and
Gentner (2005) indicating that exposure to words naming spa-
tial relations facilitates visuo-spatial reasoning in pre-schoolers
suggests that such cross-modal connections are available at the
developmental stages of interest here. As the construction of an
FCH is always the representation of an unobserved causal event,
FCH construction always involves structure mapping, even if
the mapping is as simple as replacing the initial and final states
of an episodic memory of an extended causal event with the
initial and final states of an otherwise-unobserved history (Fields,
2012a). The availability of imagined internal or remote mecha-
nisms to pre-motor structure mapping makes them, therefore,
available to pre-motor FCH construction. Visuo-motor imagi-
nation is crucial to this pathway; the incorporation of never-
observed internal or remote mechanisms into FCHs would be
predicted, on this model, not to occur prior to the age at
which such mechanisms could be imagined either visually or
verbally. The development of mechanistic reasoning capabilities
in the pre-school years, and not before, is consistent with this
prediction.
OVERRIDING THE BIAS TOWARD AGENCY
The considerations reviewed above allow the formulation of a
succinct mechanistic model of the bias toward agency. Human
infants are born with or rapidly develop abilities to segregate
objects from their backgrounds and to re-identify objects as the
same individual, persistent things over relatively short gaps in
observation. They are also born with or rapidly develop an MNS-
mediated ability to represent some observed objects—particularly
animate objects such as human beings or other animals—as
agents and to represent their actions as intentional or goal-
directed. Agents move themselves and alter their own features;
even inanimate objects that move themselves and alter their own
features are, unless their actions are highly predictable, typically
regarded as agents. Early experience moving and altering passive
inanimate objects, and observing other people moving and alter-
ing passive inanimate objects, permits the construction, by the
developing pre-motor system, of FCHs that account for changes
in the locations and features of such objects, and hence allows
the re-identification of such objects as the same individual things
across arbitrarily-long gaps in observation. These FCHs attribute
the motions and featural changes of passive inanimate objects to
external agents; hence every re-identification of such an object
after a gap in observation associates any observed changes in
the location or features of that object with some agent, even if
that agent is an unknown “someone”. Infants, therefore, have an
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unavoidable bias towards agency; agency is invoked whenever
they re-identify an object.
It is important to emphasize that the invocation of agency
required by the above model is not in general conscious. Objects
are typically re-identified within the time required for conscious
awareness; hence FCH construction is in most cases—and for
preverbal infants, arguably in all cases—an un- or pre-conscious
cognitive activity. Infants are, therefore, not predicted to be aware
of the FCHs they construct, aware of the agents that they represent
within these FCHs, or even aware of the process of re-identifying
an object. The bias toward agency is, in this model, an automatic,
unconscious bias.
Because the bias toward agency is embedded in the process
of object re-identification, it is to be expected that it would
survive into and through adulthood. What demands explana-
tion, in this model, is not why the bias toward agency sur-
vives, but rather how the bias toward agency could ever be
overridden. The model is, therefore, consistent with the obser-
vation that in some human cultures the bias toward agency
is overridden only rarely or in particular circumstances. The
model is, in particular, consistent with the ubiquity of culturally-
acknowledged supernatural explanations for many phenomena
involving changes in the locations or properties of inanimate
objects, even ones that might otherwise appear trivial. What
is anomalous within the model is the existence of individu-
als or (sub)cultures in which the behaviors of objects that are
not obvious social agents—typically, people or other animals—
are routinely explained in terms of non-agentive internal or
external mechanisms. The model predicts that such individuals
must have had, and such (sub)cultures must widely provide,
“discovery” experiences that reveal the workings of previously-
hidden mechanisms. It predicts that such individuals must exe-
cute particular kinds of inferences—structure mappings—that
replace agentive causes with mechanistic causes for both observed
and unobserved events. It also predicts that, at least in some
cases, the construction of such alternative, mechanism-based
FCHs is accompanied by the suppression of competing agent-
based FCHs. It predicts, in other words, that mere factual knowl-
edge of mechanistic causes is not enough; such causes must
be incorporated into the routine, largely unconscious process-
ing that subserves object re-identification in order to become
effective.
The current model is, therefore, prima facie inconsistent with
the idea that human beings are, in population average, “balanced”
between mentalizing and systemizing, as suggested by research
carried out with survey instruments such as the empathizing-
systemizing quotient (EQ-SQ) developed by Baron-Cohen and
colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Goldenfeld et al., 2005;
Nettle, 2007). The EQ and SQ instruments do not, however,
measure problem solving outcomes, and do not directly mea-
sure problem-solving style. Many of the proposed responses,
for example “I prefer to read non-fiction than fiction” or “I
make it a point of listening to the news each morning” mea-
sure activity preferences (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003, p. 368).
While the relatively high SQ scores of scientists, technologists,
engineers and mathematicians tested (Baron-Cohen, 2008) sug-
gest that the SQ instrument indirectly measures systemizing
ability, similar results correlating EQ score with empathizing
ability, in the strict sense of empathizing accuracy, are not
available. Very high EQ scores have, indeed, been shown in
some cases to correlate with self-reports of symptomatic psy-
chosis (Brosnan et al., 2010), while very high SQ scores cor-
relate with ASD. The “balance” between EQ and SQ scores in
the general population may, therefore, reflect a survey design
that emphasizes personality and social-interaction characteris-
tics, not actual problem-solving strategies. Many “balanced”
individuals may nonetheless be biased toward attributions of
agency, particularly when under stress or faced with unantici-
pated or extreme events. The results of Kelemen et al. (2013)
indicate, moreover, that while the bias toward agency can be
overridden, it is not extinguished even in professional physi-
cal scientists, individuals who would be expected to have very
high SQ.
The current model predicts that individuals can override the
bias toward agency, and hence develop systemizing skills includ-
ing the ability to discover previously-hidden causal mechanisms,
only if they have both appropriate learning experiences and
well-developed structure-mapping abilities. Mere exposure to the
behavior of inanimate mechanisms, or even to hidden parts such
as batteries that have causal power, is unlikely to be sufficient for
learning; as is often emphasized in relation to classroom learning
(e.g., Pintrich et al., 1993), a rich environment in which both
complex behaviors executed by mechanisms and the parts causally
responsible for such behaviors are made both observationally
and motivationally salient can be expected to be necessary. The
SQ instrument arguably measures the extent to which causal
mechanisms are salient to an individual; high SQ scores can,
therefore, be expected to be predictive of an enhanced ability to
learn systemizing skills. While structure-mapping or analogical
reasoning ability is widely acknowledged as central to general
intelligence (e.g., Gentner, 2003) and is typically measured as
a component of general intelligence, specific tests of structure-
mapping ability, especially for use in young children, have yet to
be developed.
The model of the bias toward agency that is proposed here
can be tested on a number of different levels. It is not clear, for
example, how young children categorize objects such as batteries,
remote controls or wires; were it shown that children routinely
categorized such objects as agents, the present model would
require revision. A version of the EQ-SQ instrument designed
for evaluating children as young as 4 years has been developed
(Auyeung et al., 2009). The current model would predict a positive
correlation between childhood SQ, visual imaginative ability, and
performance on tasks probing understanding of mechanisms such
as those employed by Sobel et al. (2007) or Sobel and Buchanan
(2009) with pre-schoolers. A positive correlation is similarly
predicted between any of the above measures and a focused
measure of pre-school analogical reasoning ability. A finding of
no or negative correlations between any of these measures would
cast doubt on the central mechanistic claim of the model, the
claim that attributions of mechanism-based causation require
imagination-dependent structure mapping.
A second sensitive test would be achieved by combining
the experimental designs of Gutheil et al. (2008) and Hood
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and Bloom (2008). Both designs require pre-school subjects to
re-identify one of two identically-featured objects. In the design
of Gutheil et al. (2008), a human experimenter carries one of
the objects out of the room and then back in; the subject’s task
is to recognize that this agent-executed causal process preserves
object identity. In the design of Hood and Bloom (2008), the
experimenter is replaced by a “copying machine” into which one
of the objects is put; in this case, the subject’s task is to distinguish
the original object from the “copy”. Interleaving actions on the
two objects by the experimenter and by the machine would
test subject’s abilities to construct FCHs that incorporate both
mechanisms and agents as either preservers or disruptors of object
identity. Such a test would be rendered more stringent by adding
an unobserved process, carried out either by the experimenter or
the machine, that produced featural changes to the object meant
to be recognized as “the same thing”. Performance on these re-
identification tests would be expected to correlate with childhood
SQ score as discussed above.
Direct tests of pre-motor involvement in object re-
identification are complicated by the commonly-observed
activation of the pre-motor system during episodic recall
(Moscovitch, 2008; Ranganath, 2010) and task-specific attention
(Cabeza et al., 2008; Uncapher and Wagner, 2009; Ranganath,
2010). However, consistent activation of SPL over IPL during
object re-identifications requiring mechanism-driven causation
and of IPL over SPL during object re-identifications requiring
agency-driven causation would lend credence to the model
(Fields, 2012a). Correlation of higher activation of SPL with
higher SQ, and of higher IPL activation with higher EQ, would
also tend to confirm the model. As the model relies on the
attribution of agency being a default strategy implemented by
the pre-motor system, further tests of this assumption would test
the model. Targeted suppression of activity in temporal-parietal
junction (TPJ) by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
for example, would be expected to bias subjects in favor of
mechanistic models of causation. Specific suppression of the
“wolfpack effect” (Scholl and Gao, 2013) by TMS to TPJ, for
example, would tend to confirm the model. A replication of the
explanation-validity judgment test of Kelemen et al. (2013) using
either fMRI, where enhanced IPL over SPL activation would be
expected on time-limited trials, or TMS to TPJ would also test
the model.
CONCLUSION
The developmental and neurocognitive considerations discussed
here suggest that the human bias toward agency is encoded in the
pre-motor mechanisms that enable object re-identification across
gaps in observation, and that overriding it requires the construc-
tion, again by the pre-motor system, of structure-mapping analo-
gies that replace agents with mechanisms as generators of action.
Whether this human mechanism for object re-identification is a
result of selective pressure for a “social brain” is unknown; both
studies of MNS function (Nassi and Callaway, 2009) and studies
of object re-identification (Munakata et al., 2001; Flombaum
et al., 2008) in non-human primates indicate broad similarities
with human capabilities. It is possible, however, that the devel-
opment of agentive reasoning and hence of social brains is itself
driven, at least in part, by selective advantages conferred by the
ability to re-identify objects as individuals. While memory for
places has been extensively studied even in non-primates (e.g.,
Gould et al., 2010) and many animals are known to mate for
life, little in general is known about the evolutionary origins
of memory for individual objects. Specific studies of the re-
identification of inanimate objects, such as stones or other items
used as tools, by both non-human primates and other animals
would contribute to understanding the evolutionary history of
human object re-identification capabilities. Studies addressing the
ability of non-human animals to re-identify individual objects
after hidden manipulations of their locations or salient features
would be particularly revealing.
On a more general note, the cultural history of the human
species, particularly over the past 500 years, is a history of
progressive challenges to the assumption, whether implicit and
architectural or explicit and cultural, that all autonomous cau-
sation involves agency. The bias toward agency is clearly econom-
ically significant in cultures heavily invested in, and dependent
upon, technological capabilities. It is also politically significant, as
demonstrated not only by the historic and contemporary roles of
religion in politics, but also by studies linking low SQ to reasoning
deficits such as “jumping to conclusions” (Brosnan et al., 2013).
Understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the
bias toward agency, its maintenance in the face of experience,
and the experiential and cognitive requirements for overriding
it may, therefore, prove to be of broad significance for human
culture.
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